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ABSTRACT 
This paper analyses two vintages of the key resource for research on economic 
sanctions: the Peterson Institute database reported in Hufbauer et al. (2nd 
edition in 1990 and 3rd edition in 2007). The Peterson Institute has not 
reported transparently on these changes.  
We provide detailed tables in order to facilitate comparison between 
descriptive statistics and the findings of the two editions. One way to interpret 
our results is as are porting of the 2nd edition results corrected for changes in 
methodology and case selection. 
Using descriptive statistics, ratio analysis, first-difference method and 
probit we investigate how case selection, (re)coding and new observations 
impacted on sanction characteristics and assumed effectiveness of economic 
sanctions. 
About 17% of the common cases of the 2nd and 3rd edition is modified and 
changed to some extent. The number of goals assigned to these cases increased 
from 146 to 155. The average success score increases from 6.6 to 7.0 for the 
common cases. Indeed, the mean values for all categories of core variables for 
the common cases in the 3rd edition exceed those reported in the 2nd edition. A 
redefined index value of the ‘sanction contribution’ underlies these changes. 
The lowest value index is defined as zero or negative contribution in the in 2nd 
edition whereas is limited to negative contribution in the 3rd edition (upgrading 
all zero contributions by definition) Likewise ‘modest and significant 
contribution’ is used in the 3rd edition instead of ‘substantial and decisive 
contribution’, making it easier to get a high score. We provide a probit analysis 
that shows that the 3rd edition’s methodology in comparison to the 
methodology used in the 2nd edition is biased in favour of finding positive 
results for modest policy change, regime change and the use of sanctions to 
disrupt military adventures and to achieve military impairment.  
 
Keywords 
Economic sanctions, change, modifications, mean difference, success ratios 
and the determinants of economic sanctions. 
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Reconsidering economic sanctions reconsidered 
A detailed analysis of the Peterson Institute sanction database 
1 Introduction  
This working paper analyses the development of different vintages of the 
Peterson Institute database on international economic sanctions. The Peterson 
Institute database is the most important database on the use and effectiveness 
of economic sanctions and it is a generally accepted source amongst students 
of economic coercion. This does not mean that the dataset is beyond all 
doubts. Indeed it has been criticised by many authors. Prominent amongst 
these critics is Pape (1997) who is often misquoted for having established that 
the failure rate of sanctions is 95%1. Notably, other authors have also 
recognized problems with the assessments in the Peterson Institute database. 
An example is van Bergeijk’s (1994 and 2009) assessment: 
As each outcome is the result of an evaluation of the literature on a specific case, 
it seems probable that differences of opinion exist about the value of the 
dependent variable in certain cases. Hufbauer et al. for example, code the British 
sanctions against Argentina in 1982 as relatively successful in removing 
Argentinean forces from the Falklands, whereas the Royal Marines would seem 
more deserving of the credit.  
This working paper, however is not about these manners of critiques. We take 
both individual case assessments and the selection of cases for granted. We 
simply want to investigate if (and if yes, how) the Peterson Institute researchers 
have changed their methodological minds and in addition how the new cases 
that have been collected since the 1990s change our perspective on the efficacy 
and effectiveness of economic sanctions as a tool for foreign policy. Our 
research question, in a nutshell, concerns the following issues 
• (How) did the methodology change between the different editions of 
the Peterson Institute’s report on its sanction database? 
• (How) did this influence key statistics? 
• (How) do recently collected data (i.e. post 1990) differ from pre 1990 
observations? 
Following the seminal publication of Hufbauer and Schott in 1985 two major 
new editions have been published so that we now have three vintages of this 
dataset (Hufbauer et al., 1985, 1990 and 2007). This database is the major 
empirical resource dealing with the occurrence and effectiveness of  
  
                                                
1 Pape (1997) proposes that only 5cases meet his criteria of successful sanctions. 
However, this does not imply that the success rate is only five per cent, since the 
success rate is a ratio and Pape’s arguments relate to both the numerator and the 
denominator. Using Pape’s definitions on what sanctions should not be included 
reduces the population of relevant sanctions to 44 so that the success rate is at least 
11% if one completely accepts Pape’s verdicts on successes and failures.  
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international economic sanctions as a tool of foreign policy. Hufbauer et al. 
have neither documented nor motivated changes in methodology, case 
selection and judgments and this complicates comparison of results of studies 
that are based on the different vintages of the database. This working paper 
sets a first step at a better understanding of how the rules of measurement may 
impact analyses of sanction by taking a close look at the apparent changes in 
methodology, episode, case selection and evaluation between the 2nd and 3rd 
(most recent) editions.  
Table 1 reports that the number of sanction episodes increases from 103 
to 174 cases in the 3rd edition. Some sanction episodes are split into a number 
of cases and the number of cases increases from 108 to 205 in the 2nd and 3rd 
editions, respectively. Consequently, the issue whether to analyse episodes or 
cases thus has become much more important in the 3rd edition. 
Table 1 
Economic sanctions considered in the second and third editions 
Edition  No of episodes  Cases (including split) Coverage  
Second  103 108 1914-1984 
Third  174 205 1914-2000 
Increase 68.9% 89.8% 22.5% 
Economic sanctions itself have a long history. Starting in ancient Greece, 
economic sanctions have been used as diplomatic instruments in the pursuit of 
foreign policy goals. The study by Hufbauer et al. (1985) and subsequent 
editions describe and analyze the rich history of the use of economic sanctions 
in the 20th and 21th century in order to provide a recipe for the ‘success’ for the 
attainment of certain foreign policy goals. The 2ndedition (Hufbauer, Schott 
and Elliott) considers 103 episodes of economic sanctions starting from the 
economic blockade of Germany during World War I to the economic 
sanctions imposed by the United States and organization of Eastern Caribbean 
States on Greneda. The list of episodes considered in the 2ndedition does not 
include all instances since World War I: the information used in the second 
edition omitted many uses of economic sanctions imposed between powers of 
the second and third rank as they were insufficiently documented in the 
English language and some instances may have been overlooked if the 
sanctions were imposed by the major powers in comparative secrecy to achieve 
relatively modest goals. 
In the 3rdedition of Economic Sanctions Reconsidered by Hufbauer, Schott, 
Elliott and Oegg (2007), 174 episodes of economic sanctions are considered. 
Considering the facts of economic and political variables by foreign policy 
goals up to 1983, a total of 108 cases were considered in the 2ndedition of 
which 3 cases were deleted (the appear only in the 2nd edition and not in the 3rd 
edition). So, 105 common cases are analyzed in both 2nd and 3rd editions. The 
other 100 cases of economic sanctions are completely new and of course 
analyzed only in the 3rd edition.  
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A detailed analysis of the two editions revealed that for the common cases 
the description and evaluation often differ regarding sanction goals, senders, 
targets and economic and political variables. The motivation for our working 
paper is that the 3rd edition does not report these modifications in the 
methodology and changes. This implies that research based on the 2nd and 3rd 
edition will not only differ because new cases have been added, but also due to 
the underlying shift in methodologies. Typically this is important when new 
results emerge or when the robustness of findings is an issue. We have 
constructed a data set for both editions and use this new data set to analyze the 
changes and modifications in the 3rd edition vis-à-vis the 2nd edition. We start by 
analysing the common 101 cases. Then we take a look at how splitting cases 
has an impact. We also assess how the information on the explanatory political 
and economic variables changed between the editions and for generalization of 
the changes and modifications, report changes in the averages of the economic 
and political variables. One way to interpret our results is as the reporting of results of the 
2nd edition corrected for changes in methodology and case selection.  
The remainder of this paper is constructed as follows. Section 2 elaborates 
on the changes and modifications of the episodes and cases of economic 
sanctions. Section 3 reports summary statistics of the core political and 
economic variables for the common cases of 2nd and 3rd editions. Success ratios 
of these variables are analysed in-depth in section 4 in order to look at the 
changes and modifications between the common and full sample in the 3rd 
edition. Section 5 presents single-difference and probit model estimation for 
the effectiveness of economic sanctions. The final section draws conclusions   
2 Changes and modifications between the editions 
This section reports on differences between the 2nd and 3rd editions with 
respect to the sanction goals, principal sender(s), target(s) and economic and 
political variables for sanctions in the 1914-1984 periods.  
 
New and deleted episodes 
Two episodes are no longer in the 3rd edition: the dropped episodes are 65-4 
(US versus Arab League) and 73-3 (US versus Chile). The goal of sanction case 
65-4 is to stop US firms from cooperating with the Arab boycott of Israel and 
the sanction goal of 73-3 is to improve human rights in Chile (the first two 
digits of the sanction case refer to the year that the sanction was implemented; 
the final digit is an identifier; so 65-4 is the 4th sanction case in 1965). The 
deletion of the episodes has not been motivated.  
The new episodes that are incorporated in the 3rd edition, within the time 
periods considered for 2nd edition, are 71-2 and 77-8. The United States is the 
principal sender for the first newly added episode and its target is Malta and 
aims at reinstituting a defense agreement. For the second episode, the principal 
sender is also the US and Ethiopia is the target. In case 77-8, two goals are set: 
to settle expropriation claims and to improve human rights.  
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Goals 
For some episodes in the 3rd edition Hufbauer et al. added new goals and/or 
modified and changed some of the stated goals in the 2nd edition. For example, 
two goals are report in case of 76-3 in the 2nd edition: in casu to settle 
expropriation claims and to improve human rights. In the 3rd edition the goal 
becomes anti-boycott restrictions on US firms. The conclusion is, therefore, 
that two goals are dropped and one new goal is added in the 3rd edition. In the 
2ndedition, a total of 146 goals were set for 101 episodes. The number of goals 
is raised to 155 in the 3rd edition for the same 101 episodes and this increases 
the average number of goals per episode from 1.45 to 1.53 in the 3rd edition. 
Detailed findings are reported in Table 2.  
In fiveepisodes the principal sender or target are either changed or 
modified. An example is case 82-2: the Netherlands and United States are the 
principal senders in the 2ndedition, but only the Netherlands is in the 3rd 
edition. Table 3 provides details. 
Table 2 
Changes regarding number of goals for the common cases 
Case ID Sender Target No of goals No of 
goals 
deleted 
No of 
goals 
added 2nd 3rd 
50-1 United States 
and 
United Nations  
North Korea 1 2 1 2 
54-4 United States, 
South Vietnam 
North Vietnam 2 5 - 3 
63-1 United States United Arab Republic 2 1 1 - 
75-3 United States Eastern Europe 1 2 1 2 
76-3 United States Ethiopia 2 1 2 1 
78-8 United States  Libya 2 3 - 1 
80-2 United States Iraq 1 2 - 1 
82-2 Netherlands and  
United States 
Suriname 2 3 - 1 
82-3 South Africa Lesotho  1 2 - 1 
83-3 United States Zimbabwe  1 3 - 2 
 
Table 3 
 Changes of principal sender and target 
Case ID 2nd edition 3rd edition 
Principal sender 
39-1 Alliance Powers Alliance Powers, US 
61-3 Western Allies US, Western Allies 
82-2 Netherlands and US Netherlands 
Target  
56-3 UK, France UK 
76-3 Ethiopia Arab League 
Source: Authors’ findings from new dataset constructed from Hufbauer et al. (1985 & 2007) 
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2.1 Reflection on changes in economic and political 
variables 
Table 4lists the political variables are considered in the 2nd edition (6 items) and 
the 3rd edition (9 items).  The health and stability index is dropped in the 3rd 
edition from the list of political variables an instead is considered to be an 
economic variable. Four new political variables cover cooperating international 
organizations, the regime of target (democracy/autocracy) and political 
relations (prior and during). 
Table 4 
List of political variables 
Political variables in the 2nd edition Political variables in the 3rd edition 
Companion policies Companion policies 
International cooperation with sender (index) International cooperation with sender (index) 
International assistance to target International assistance to target 
Sanctions period (years) Duration of sanctions (years) 
Health and stability (index) - 
Prior relations (index) Prior relations (index) 
- Cooperating international organizations 
- Regime of target 
- Political stability prior 
- Political stability during  
Table 5lists the economic variables in the 2nd and 3rd editions. The changes are 
that ‘health and stability’, which was considered as political variable in the 2nd 
edition, is now considered to be ‘economic’ rather than ‘political’ and that 
GDP growth and inflation are added. 
Table 5 
List of economic variables 
2nd edition 3rd edition 
Cost to target (million dollars) Cost to target (million dollars) 
Cost as percentage of GNP Cost as percentage of GNP 
Cost per capita Cost per capita 
Trade linkage (%) Trade linkage (%) 
GNP ratio: sender to target GNP ratio: sender to target 
Type of sanction Type of sanction 
Cost to sender (index) Cost to sender (index) 
- Health and stability 
- GDP growth rate 
- Inflation rate 
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2.2 Splitting cases2 
This section concerns the cases that are split into sub-cases in the 3rd edition. 
Splitting cases increases the number of observations to 108 in the 2nd edition (3 
of which are considered only in the 2nd edition; the other 105 cases are 
considered and analyzed in both editions). The split cases are 32-1, 39-1, 48-3, 
71-1, 73-1 and 77-4.  Table 6 shows details. The split is made to disaggregate 
the economic and political variables for different country contexts. 
Table 6 
Details of split cases 
Case ID 
in the 2nd 
edition 
Case ID 
in the 3rd 
edition 
Sender 
in 2nd 
edition 
Sender  
in 3rd 
edition 
Target in 
2nd edition 
Target in  
3rd  edition 
Changes 
made in 3rd 
edition 
32-1 32-1(1) League 
of Nations 
League 
of Nations 
Paraguay 
and Bolivia 
Paraguay Both political 
and 
economic 
variables 
32-1(2) Bolivia 
39-1 39-1(1) Alliance 
powers 
Alliance 
powers 
Germany, 
later Japan 
Germany Both political 
and 
economic 
variables 39-1(2) USA Japan 
48-3 48-3(1) USSR USSR USA, UK. 
France 
USA Both political 
and 
economic 
variables 
48-3(2) UK 
48-3(3) France 
71-1 71-1 (1) USA USA India and 
Pakistan 
Pakistan Both political 
and 
economic 
variables 
71-1 (2) India 
73-1 73-1(1) Arab 
League 
Arab 
League 
USA, 
Netherlands 
USA Both political 
and 
economic 
variables 
73-1(2) Netherlands  
77-4 77-4 (1) Canada  Canada  Japan, EC EC Both political 
and 
economic 
variables 
77-4(2)  Japan 
2.3 Changes in the core variables for the success score 
This section considers the three core variables that are widely used for 
measuring the effectiveness of economic sanctions: 
• the policy result index,  
• sanction contribution index and  
• the success score (policy result multiplied by sanction contribution).  
                                                
2 The consideration of economic and political variables by foreign policy goals gives 
rise to the number of cases due to the split.  
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We use the common 105 cases including the split to analyze changes in the 
assessments of policy result, sanction contribution and success score, also in 
relation to political and economic explanatory variables. Policy result comprises 
• failed,  
• unclear but possibly positive,  
• positive and  
• successful outcomes.  
Figure 1 
Changes in the policy result (% of cases, N = 105) 
 
From this perspective it is important to note that Hufbauer et al. (2007) appear 
to have changed the methodology for assessing the sanction contribution. For 
example, the lowest score (1) was assigned to ‘zero or negative’ contribution’ in 
the 2nd edition, but in the 3rd edition the lowest score is attributed to ‘negative’ 
contributions only so that a zero contribution would score ‘1’ in the 2ndbut‘2’ 
in the 3rd edition. Likewise the highest score in the 3rd edition is assigned to 
‘substantial and decisive’ where the top contribution category was ‘modest and 
significant’ contributions in the 2nd edition respectively (Table 7). 
Table 7 
Reflection on changes regarding the contribution of economic sanctions 
Index value Contribution in the  2nd edition Contribution in the  3rd  edition 
1 Zero or negative Negative contribution 
2 Minor Minor 
3 Modest Substantial 
4 Significant Decisive 
 
0 20 40
Failed
outcome
Unclear but
possibly…
Positive
outcome
Successful
outcome
Per cent
Third edition
Second
edition
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Figure 2 and Table A.2 report how the new scales for the sanction contribution 
influence the results. The share of the bottom category reduces from 31% to 
8% and the share of ‘minor contributions’ almost doubles to 52%. The 
consequence of the new scaling is that the share of extreme cases with a 
contribution score of 1 and 4 reduces from 45% to 16%. 
Figure 2 
Reflection of changes regarding contribution 
 
Also the success score change between the two editions. For the common 
cases, the average success scores are 6.6and7.0 for the 2nd and 3rd edition, 
respectively. The average success score increased and the standard deviation 
decreased, but the mean difference of the success score for the common cases 
in the 2nd and 3rd edition is not statistically significant (Table 8).  
Table 8 
Comparison of success score 
Edition Mean Standard deviation 
2ndedition   6.6 5.1 
3rd edition  7.0 4.5 
N=105 
Source: Authors’ findings from new dataset. 
The cumulative frequency distribution of the success score in Figure 3shows 
the noteworthy changes for the success scores. Interestingly, the lines for the 
cumulative percentage distribution for the 2nd and 3rd editions cross at a success 
score of 8, the traditional cut off value for failure. 
0 20 40 60
Zero or…
Minor…
Modest/Su…
Significant/…
Per cent
Third edition
Second
edition
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Figure 3 
Cumulative frequency distribution of success score 
 
Note: No success score of 3 exists in the data set. 
2.4 Changes in political variables 
This section focuses on the changes in some political variables comparing the 
findings between the editions with respect to companion policies, support for 
and pre-sanction interaction between target and sender. Table 9 reports on 
companion policies and provides details for the 7 dropped cases and the 3 
added cases in the 3rd edition (see also Table A.3).  
Table 9 
Changes in the companion policies 
Case ID Companion policies Changes in the 3rd 
edition 2nd edition 3rd edition 
44-1 Quasi-military  operation - Dropped 
49-1 Quasi or regular military action - Dropped 
54-2 - Regular military action Added 
54-4 Regular military action - Dropped 
60-31 Quasi-military or covert action - Dropped 
61-3 - Quasi-military operations Added 
71-1 Quasi-military operations - Dropped 
80-2 Covert action - Dropped 
81-1 - Quasi-military or covert action Added 
82-2 Covert action - Dropped 
The Hufbauer et al. view on international cooperation with the sender changes 
only marginally between editions (Table A.4) but their view on international 
assistance to target changed: the 2nd edition identifies international assistance to 
the target in 25.7% of the 105 common cases, but in the 3rd edition, this  
0
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reduces to 21.9%.  Changes with respect to prior relations between target and 
sender occur in 60-3, 60-3(1), 75-3, 75-4, 75-5 and 76-3. Table A.5).  
Duration of sanctions changes to a great extent in the 3rd edition but this is 
not due to changes in methodology and simply reflects the sanctions that were 
ongoing in 1990 (the cut-off point of the 2nd edition) so that average duration 
for the common cases increased from 5.3 to 7.1 years in the 3rd edition. 
2.5 Changes in economic variables 
Table 10 
Comparison of types of sanction 
Sanction 
type 
2nd edition 3rd edition 
No  
of cases 
%  
of cases 
No  
of cases 
%  
of cases 
M 3 3.1 3 3.1 
F,M 6 6.1 3 3.1 
F,X 11 11.2 13 13.3 
F 26 26.5 25 25.5 
F,X,M 31 31.6 33 33.7 
X 16 16.3 17 17.3 
X,M 5 5.1 4 4.1 
Total 98 100 98 100 
Here we discuss changes in identified type of sanctions, cost to sender and 
health and stability. The type of sanction refers to the interruption of 
commercial finance, aid and other official finance (F), interruption of exports 
from the sender country to the target country (X), interruption of imports by 
the sender country from the target country (M) and combinations (Table 10). 
Table 10 reports the common 98 cases though we find 100 cases in the 2nd 
edition. The two missing cases only in the 3rd edition are 65-1 and 78-2. The 
common missing cases in both editions are 21-1, 25-1, 61-3, 62-2 & 75-1. 
Table11 
 Cost to sender and health and stability of target (N = 105) 
Economic variables 2nd edition  
(% of cases) 
3rd edition  
(% of cases) 
Change 
(% points) 
Cost to sender 
Net gain to sender  32.4 30.5 -1.9 
Little effect on sender 45.7 47.6 1.9 
Modest welfare loss to sender 17.1 16.2 -0.9 
Major loss to sender 4.8 5.7 0.9 
Health and stability 
Distressed country 17.1 18.1 1 
Country with significant problems 42.9 44.8 1.9 
Strong and stable country 40.0 37.1 -2.9 
N=105 
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Table 11 compares two variables measured with an index scale: cost to the 
sender and health and stability of the target economy. Typically, Hufbauer et al 
in the 3rd edition see less sender countries that actually gain from the sanctions 
and a somewhat higher level of instability than in the 2nd edition. 
2.6 Changes in identified foreign policy objectives 
There are five major types of foreign policy objectives identified for the 
sanctions episodes. The foreign policy goal categories are  
• modestchanges in target-country policies,  
• destabilization of target government/democratization,  
• disruption of military government other than major wars,  
• impairment of military potential including major wars and 
• other major changes in the target country.  
Major changes have occurred with respect to the attribution of foreign policy 
goals to sanction episodes. 
Table12 
Comparison of foreign policy goals (N = 105) 
Groups of foreign policy goals  2nd 
(%) 
3rd 
(%) 
Modest changes in target-country policies 41.0 21.0 
Destabilization of target government/democratization 18.1 34.3 
Disruption of military government other than major wars 16.2 12.4 
Impairment of military potential including major wars 9.5 16.2 
Other major changes in the target country 15.2 16.2 
N=105 
Table 12 illustrates that in the 2ndedition, 41% cases are considered to aim at 
modest policy changes in the target country whereas it is only 21% in the 
3rdedition. This appears to reflect a re-evaluation of the importance of 
destabilizing government or democratization. Interestingly also the judgement 
changes with regard to ‘disruption of military government other than major 
wars’ versus ‘impairment of military potential including major wars’. All in all a 
very substantial change occurs in the distribution of the common cases of 
economic sanctions by foreign policy goals. 
3 Comparison of  summary statistics: core, political and 
economic variables 
This section reflects the changes using summary statistics in order to compare 
between the editions. First of all, it focuses on the changes in the core 
variables. Then we consider the changes in the political and economic variables 
respectively.  
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3.1 Changes in the core variables 
The core variables are indices for policy result, sanction contribution and the 
success score. The success score is the product of policy result and sanction 
contribution and assumes the values of 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 8, 9, 12 and 16. Table 13 
reports the distribution of the success score for the common cases in the 2nd 
and 3rd edition, respectively. The share of successes (with a score of 9, 12 or 
16) remains at a stable around 36%. The share of complete e.g., significant 
failures decreases sharply reflecting the methodological changes discussed 
earlier. As a result on average policy result, sanction contribution and success 
score increase (Table 14). Since the distribution shifts up while the maximum 
score remains at it is, the standard deviations for sanction contribution and 
success score in the 3rd edition are reduced by definition. 
Table 13 
Frequency distribution of success score 
Success score 
2nd edition 3rd edition 
Frequency % of cases Frequency % ofcases 
1 29 27.6 8 7.6 
2 4 3.8 18 17.1 
4 19 18.1 17 16.2 
6 9 8.6 14 13.3 
8 6 5.7 11 10.5 
9 8 7.6 9 8.6 
12 19 18.1 20 19.1 
16 11 10.5 8 7.6 
Total  105 100 105 100 
Note: No success score of 3 exists in the data set. 
Table 14 
Comparison of summary statistics of the core variables 
Variables  
No of 
cases 
2nd edition 3rd edition 
Mean SD Mean SD 
Core variables 
Policy result  105 2.5 1.2 2.7 1.2 
Sanction contribution 105 2.23 1.0 2.4 0.8 
Success score 105 6.6 5.1 7.0 4.7 
3.2 Changes in the political and economic variables 
Table 15 summarizes the average indicators for political and economic 
variables in the 2nd and 3rd edition. The set of political variables changes 
simply too much to make a sensible comparison in this respect. In comparing 
the economic variables it is important to note that the data are often in current 
prices and at current exchange rates so that comparison over time is 
compromised by inflation and exchange rate volatility (van Bergeijk 1989). The 
appropriate measures for comparison are therefore costs in per cent of GNP 
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and trade linkage which both are slightly but not significantly lower in the 3rd 
edition. GNP ratio sender to target is at a comparable level. 
Table 15 
Comparison of summary statistics of the political and economic variables 
Variables  No of 
cases 
2nd edition 3rd edition 
Mean SD Mean SD 
Political variables  
International cooperation  105 1.97 1.08 1.96 1.08 
Duration (in years) 105 5.3 7.6 7.1 10.1 
Health and stability  105 2.23 0.72 - - 
Prior relations 105 2.09 0.72 2.07 0.72 
Regime of target 101 - - 1.75 0.82 
Prior political stability 101 - - 0.13 0.21 
Political stability during  101 - - 0.06 0.17 
Economic variables  
Cost to target (million $) 96 (94) 207 681 218 566 
Cost as a % of GNP 79 (93) 1.8 3.2 1.7 3.1 
Cost per capita  94 (93) 9.1 27.4 11.4 34.0 
Trade linkage (%) 102 (103) 22.6 21.1 22.0 20.7 
GNP ratio (sender to 
target) 
105 (104) 554 3241 548 3251 
Cost to sender 105 1.9 0.8 2.0 0.8 
Health and stability  105 - - 2.2 0.7 
GDP growth rate 93 - - 4.3 3.0 
Inflation  74 - - 22.8 44.0 
Note: Number in the parentheses implies the cases in the 3rd edition only. 
4 Comparison of  common cases versus full sample 
In this section we change the methodology in order look at the changes 
between the editions from a different perspective. We are now comparing the 
common cases (covered in both editions) with the full sample. For these 
common cases, we use the data from the 3rd edition. The full sample considers 
all 205 cases in the 3rd edition based on economic and political variables by 
foreign policy goals. This comparison tells us how the recent post 1990 cases 
change conclusions on characteristics and outcome of economic sanctions.  
4.1 Comparison of foreign policy goals 
Table 16 and figure 4 show the changes in the distribution of the common and 
full sample. It shows that about 34% of the common cases aim at regime 
change and democratization and 39% in the full sample. The shares of 
disruption of military adventure and military impairment as foreign policy goals 
of economic sanctions decline. 
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The distribution of failure cases by foreign policy goals is shown in Table 
17, indicating an increase for regime change and democratization at the 
expense of all other categories, see Figure 4.   
Table 16 
Comparison of foreign policy goals 
Foreign policy goals 
Common cases Full sample 
Cases % Cases % 
Modest policy changes 22 21.0 43 21.0 
Regime Change and democratization 36 34.3 80 39.0 
Disruption of military Adventure 13 12.4 19 9.3 
Military impairment 17 16.2 29 14.1 
Other major policy changes 17 16.2 34 16.6 
Total 105 100 205 100 
Table 17 
Comparison of failure cases by foreign policy goals 
Foreign policy goals  
Common cases Full sample 
Failure cases % Failure cases % 
Modest policy changes 11 16.2 21 15.6 
Regime Change and democratization 21 30.9 55 40.7 
Disruption of military Adventure 9 13.2 15 11.1 
Military impairment  13 19.1 20 14.8 
Other major policy changes  14 20.6 24 17.8 
Total  68 100 135 100 
Figure 4 
Comparison of success by foreign policy goals  
(total population versus common cases) 
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4.2 Success ratio analysis: common versus full sample 
This section uses ratio analysis to look at how the ratios of the core, political 
and economic variables change due to the post 1990 cases. The success ratio is 
defined as the proportion of success cases to the total cases for each particular 
foreign policy goal. In addition, we also measure the overall success ratio.  
4.2.1 Success ratio by foreign policy goals 
Table 18 
Comparison of success ratio by foreign policy goals 
Foreign policy goals  
Success ratio 
Common cases Full sample 
Modest policy changes 50 51 
Regime Change and democratization 42 31 
Disruption of military Adventure 31 21 
Military impairment  24 31 
Other major policy changes  18 27 
Total  35 34 
Note: Detailed findings are reported in table A.7. 
Table 18 shows that the success ratio differs substantially with respect to the 
foreign policy goals. For example, the success ratio for the common cases is 
42% for regime change and democratization whereas it is 31% in the full 
sample. For military impairment an increase occurs. Detailed findings are 
reported in table A.7. 
4.2.2 Successes of the core and political variables 
Table 19 reports success to failure ratios of the core and political variables 
Success ratios differ only among the components of companion policies.   
The success ratio of the regular military action is about 31%, which is 
below the success ratio of the core variable, but in the full sample, it is around 
33%. In terms of prior relation to the target, cordial prior relationship is 
associated with higher success ratio in both categories though it is higher for 
the common cases. International assistance to target reduces the success ratio 
as it is lower than the overall success ratio. Substantial change is found in the 
success ratio for cooperating international organization as it is 50% and 37% 
around for the common and full sample respectively. This study finds that 
duration or length of economic sanction is very important for effectiveness as 
above average duration is associated with an almost halving of the success 
ratio.3 Table A.8 shows the detailed findings. 
  
                                                
3 Compare Van Bergeijk and Van Marrewijk 1995 and Dizaji and van Bergeijk 2012. 
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Table 19 
Comparison of success ratios of core and political variables 
Variables  Common cases Full sample 
Core variable 
Success score 35.2 34.3 
Political variables:  
Companion policies 
Regular military action 30.8 33.3 
Quasi-military operation 37.5 21.1 
Covert action 62.5 55.6 
International cooperation 
No cooperation 40.0 41.0 
Minor cooperation 31.8 17.0 
Modest  cooperation 30.0 37.0 
Significant cooperation 30.8 39.3 
Prior relation  
Antagonistic  12.5 18.8 
Neutral  36.0 33.3 
Cordial  51.6 46.4 
Regime of target 
Autocracy 28.6 26.1 
Democracy 45.8 48.0 
Others  
International assistance to target 26.1 20.5 
Cooperating international organization 50.0 36.6 
Duration less than or equal average 39.2 39.5 
Duration greater than average 23.1 21.1 
 
4.2.3 Success ratio by economic variables 
This section identifies the impact of economic variables focusing on how the 
success ratios vary between the common and full sample in the 3rd edition 
(Table 20). The detailed findings of the ratio analysis are reported in table A.9. 
It should be noted again that the measurement of these variables is not 
correct in Hufbauer et al. editions since trade and inflation will be influenced 
by economic sanctions and should therefore be measured prior to the 
sanctions, per capita costs should be expressed at constant prices, etc. Also the 
choice of economic variables is not always appropriate. For example, potential 
costs would seem to be more relevant than actual costs.  
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Table 20 
Comparison of success ratios of economic variables 
Variables Common cases Full sample 
Health and stability 
Distressed 68.4 42 
Significant problems 34.0 34 
Strong and stable 20.5 26 
Health and stability overall  35.2 34 
Sanctions type 
Financial and export or import 32.7 32 
Export or import or both 20.8 25 
Only financial 48.0 36 
Overall of sanction type 33.7 32 
Cost to sender 
Net gain to sender 46.9 41 
Little effect on sender 34.0 31 
Modest loss 23.5 31 
Major loss 16.7 30 
Cost to sender overall 35.2 34 
Cost to target 
Cost as a % of GNP (<= average) 31.3 29 
Cost as a % of GNP (>average) 46.2 46 
Cost per capita (<= average) 29.9 30 
Cost per capita (>average) 62.5 52 
Trade 
Trade linkage (<= average) 29.5 32 
Trade linkage (> average) 45.2 40 
Trade linkage overall 35.9 35 
GNP, GDP and Inflation  
GNP ratio (<=average) 34.4 35 
GNP ratio (>average) 42.9 26 
GDP growth (<=average) 37.5 35 
GDP growth (>average) 35.6 36 
Inflation (<=average) 44.1 37 
Inflation (>average) 40.0 53 
5 Determinants of  success of  the economic sanctions 
This section focuses on the determinants of success of the economic sanctions 
based on the mean difference test (independent sample t-tests, which helps to 
identify whether any significant differences in terms of mean values exist 
between the success and failure groups. These tests apply to the ‘success’ and 
‘failure’ groups. Firstly, they identify the determinants of success for the core, 
political and economic variables. Secondly, they focus on the determinants of 
success of the core variables by foreign policy goals. Thirdly, they identify the 
determinants of success of the foreign policy goals. For all cases, we compare 
the results between the common and full sample. 
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5.1 Determinants of success of the core, political and 
economic variables 
Table 21 
Mean difference test for the core, political and economic variables 
Variables 
Common case Full sample 
Success Failure MD Success Failure MD 
Core variables 
Policy result  3.73 2.07 1.66*** 3.59 2.14 1.44*** 
Sanction Contribution 3.24 1.96 1.29*** 3.26 2.01 1.24*** 
Success score 12.14 4.18 7.96*** 11.69 4.41 7.28*** 
Political variables  
International cooperation  1.84 2.03 -0.19 2.07 2.10 -0.03 
Duration 4.24 8.71 -4.46** 4.24 8.42 -4.18*** 
Prior relation  2.35 1.91 0.44*** 2.33 1.99 -0.34*** 
Regime of target 1.91 1.67 0.25 2.00 1.68 0.32*** 
Political stability prior 0.12 0.13 -0.01 0.12 0.17 -0.05 
Political stability during 0.07 0.06 0.01 0.07 0.09 -0.03 
Economic variables  
Cost to target 320.08 162.89 157.19 657.98 450.67 207.31 
Cost (% of GNP) 2.69 1.13 1.55** 4.18 2.53 1.66 
Cost per capita  16.19 8.78 7.41 46.88 30.49 16.39 
Trade linkage  26.03 19.70 6.33 33.23 29.05 4.17 
GNP ratio  316.76 675.63 -358.87 1014.53 2378.19 -1363.67 
Health stability  1.86 2.37 -0.50*** 1.86 2.06 -0.20* 
Cost to sender  1.76 2.09 -0.33** 1.86 1.99 -0.14 
GDP growth rate  4.44 4.30 0.14 2.53 3.47 -0.94 
Inflation  17.86 26.54 -8.67 184.37 45.80 138.57* 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05 and *p<0.1 
Table 21 shows that there are significant statistical differences between the 
groups both in the common and full sample.  
In order to identify what are the determinants of success of the political 
variables, we have applied the independent sample t-test for the political 
variables, checking how the result varies from common to the full sample (we 
provide a multivariate analysis in section 5.5). For the common cases, 
significant differences exist between the groups for duration and prior relation 
variables. The sign of the mean difference is positive for prior relation and 
negative for duration, implying that the mean value of the success is higher 
than the failure group. Thus the higher is the mean value for the prior relation 
and the more cordial the relationship between the target and the sender, the 
more likely that the economic sanction would be successful.  Conversely, the 
negative sign in the mean difference for duration implies that mean value of 
duration is larger for the failure than the success group.  It implies that larger 
the length of the duration of economic sanctions, the less likely that the 
economic sanction would be successful. Thus the duration, prior relation and 
regime of target are found to be the most important determinants of success of 
economic sanctions.  
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The determinants of success of the economic variables show the 
significant differences in cost as a percentage of GNP to the target, health and 
stability of the target economy and the cost to sender. But in the full sample, 
we do not find significant difference between the groups for cost as a 
percentage of GNP and cost to sender. However, there are significant 
differences between the groups for health and stability and inflation of the 
target economy in the full sample. The negative sign of health and stability 
implies that mean value of this is lower for the success case than that of the 
failures. For the third addition, we observe the difference is positive for 
inflation and it is statistically significantly different from zero at the 10% level 
of significance. Therefore ‘health and stability’ and inflation are the two main 
economic determinants of the success in the full sample though other 
differences give a lot of information for policy purposes.  
Note again that we simply follow the Hufbauer et al. approach although 
important explanatory variables have been omitted. That is not of concern here 
because we want to see how results reported by Hufbauer et al change between 
the 2nd and 3rd edition when we correct for changes in methodology and case 
selection. Readers interested in a comprehensive analysis of alternative analytic 
approaches are referred to van Bergeijk (2009). 
5.2 Determinants of success by foreign policy goals 
This study uses policy result, sanctions contribution and success score as the 
core variables as these are widely used to see the effectiveness of economic 
sanctions. The findings are summarized in table 22, which shows that all the 
mean differences are statistically significant at the 10% level of significance 
though the mean differences for each variable differ across foreign policy 
goals. For example, the mean difference is 2.55 for policy result in the 
common case. For policy result we find that mean values of the policy result 
index are lower in the full sample for all types of foreign policies except for 
other major changes in the target country. The highest mean difference value is 
found for impairment of military adventures including major wars at 2.1 in the 
full sample. The mean values of sanctions contribution and success score also 
varies across foreign policy goals both for common and full sample. Whereas 
the highest mean differences are 1.7 and 10.5 for disruption of military 
adventures other than major wars and impairment of military adventures 
including major wars respectively in the common case, it is 1.6 and 9.0 in the 
full sample. Therefore, we can conclude that the highest mean differences for 
all three categories are not consistent for measuring the effectiveness of foreign 
policies. The effectiveness of foreign policies depends on what types of 
indicators we use for the measurement. The mean values and the differences 
are summarized in Table 22.  
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Table 22 
Mean difference test for the core variables by foreign policy goals 
Variables  
Common case Full sample 
Mean difference Mean difference 
Modest policy change  
Policy result  2.6*** 1.7*** 
Sanction Contribution 1.3*** 1.1*** 
Success score 8.5*** 7.6*** 
Regime change and democratization 
Policy result  1.4*** 1.2*** 
Sanction Contribution 1.1*** 1.1*** 
Success score 6.6*** 6.6*** 
Disruption of military adventures other than major wars 
Policy result  1.9*** 1.3** 
Sanction Contribution 1.7*** 1.6*** 
Success score 10.0*** 8.8*** 
Impairment of military adventure including major wars 
Policy result  2.2*** 2.1*** 
Sanction Contribution 1.6*** 1.4*** 
Success score 10.5*** 9.0*** 
Other major changes in the target country  
Policy result  1.4* 1.5*** 
Sanction Contribution 1.3*** 1.2*** 
Success score 7.6*** 6.8*** 
Note: + the detailed findings are available in table A.10. Here we have only reported the mean 
difference as it is worthwhile and convenient to observe the result. Positive sign of the mean difference 
implies the higher mean value for the success than the failure group.  
***p<0.01, **p<0.05 and *p<0.1  
5.3 Determinants of success by political variables 
As it is clear from the previous discussion that success scores differ across the 
foreign policy goals, this section focuses on the determinants of success of 
each foreign policy goal separately. Here we also compare results of the full 
sample with the common cases. Table 23 shows that mean value of 
international cooperation is marginally lower for success than the failure cases 
both in the common and full sample. Larger mean value of duration is found 
for the failure cases and it is statistically significant for the full sample. 
Therefore, duration plays an important role for a modest foreign policy to be 
effective. The economic sanctions that take short duration are more likely to 
succeed. Mean difference values are found positive for prior relation and 
regime of target. Economic sanctions therefore have higher possibility of 
success if the sender had cordial relationship with target and the sender 
targeted the democratic regime. The magnitudes are very small and negative 
for the political stability prior and during the economic sanctions. In the full 
sample, mean difference is positive and statistically significant at 5% level for 
regime of target and is negative and statistically significant for duration. Thus 
we find the two most important determinants of modest policy change: 
duration and the regime of target.  
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For the regime change and democratization, the mean values of 
international cooperation, duration and political stability prior are lower for the 
success group than the failure, but the mean differences are not statistically 
significant. However the mean values of prior relation and regime of target of 
the success cases are higher and statistically significant at 5% and 1% level of 
significance respectively. Prior relations and regime of target therefore play an 
important role in the effectiveness of economic sanctions in order to achieve 
regime change and democratization as a foreign policy goal.  
Table 23 shows that none of the mean difference of the political variables 
is statistically significant for the disruption of military adventures. Though the 
mean values of success cases are same in the common and full sample, mean 
values of the failure cases differ between the common and full sample. The 
absolute mean difference is higher for duration both in the common and full 
sample. This implies that the mean value of duration of the failure cases is 
higher than that of successes.  In all other political variables, the magnitudes of 
the mean difference are not large. Therefore, there are no political variables 
that can play an important role in the effectiveness of economic sanctions in 
order to achieve disruption of military adventures.  
We find no statistically significant mean differences both in common cases 
and the third edition for military impairment. The mean values of success and 
failure cases differ between common and full sample. The absolute mean 
difference is higher for duration both in the common and full sample. This 
implies that the mean value of duration of the failure cases is higher than that 
of successes.  Though the mean differences are positive for international 
cooperation and prior relation in the common cases, these are negative for all 
other political variables. But in the full sample, all the mean differences except 
for international cooperation are negative. (The sign of the mean difference 
could perhaps play a role for policy implication of the effectiveness of 
economic sanctions on a certain foreign policy goal.) 
The independent sample t-test shows that for the common case there is a 
significant and positive mean difference of political stability prior to the 
economic sanctions imposed on the target country.  However, this mean 
difference is not statistically significant in the full sample. Mean differences of 
the two political variables, international cooperation and prior relation, are 
found statistically significant in the full sample.  
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Table 23 
Mean difference test for the political variables by foreign policy goals 
Political variables 
Mean difference 
Modest policy Regime change and 
democratization 
Military disruption Military impairment Others 
Common Full Common Full Common Full Common Full Common Full 
International cooperation -0.09 -0.36 -0.36 -0.16 0.28 0.30 0.04 0.49 -0.05 0.72* 
Duration -3.09 -3.66** -2.60 -2.56 -3.97 -4.88 -6.48 -5.48 -10.12 -6.08 
Prior relation 0.18 0.32 0.56** 0.37** 0.36 0.32 0.56 -0.09 0.60 0.63** 
Regime of target 0.73* 0.62** 0.26 0.45*** 0.08 -0.18 -0.52 -0.48 1.00 0.33 
Political stability prior 0.00 -0.04 -0.10 -0.06 0.19 0.15 -0.13 -0.16 0.32** 0.05 
Political stability during -0.09 -0.09 0.03 -0.03 - - -0.02 -0.03 -0.01 0.03 
Note: + the detailed findings are available in table A.11. Here we have only reported the mean difference as it is worthwhile and convenient to ob-
serve the result. Positive sign of the mean difference implies the higher mean value for the success. 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05 and *p<0.1  
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5.4 Determinants of success of the foreign policy goals by 
economic variables 
What factors influence the foreign policy to be successful? This question arises 
in the mind of researchers and policy makers alike in order to observe the 
determinants of success by the foreign policy goals. This section analyses the 
determinants of success of the foreign policy goals in details using the 
approach of independent sample t-test. 
Firstly, we focus on the modest policy change based on economic 
variables and also compare results of the full sample with the common cases. 
Mean differences are positive for cost to target, cost as a percentage of GNP, 
cost per capita, trade linkage and inflation in the common cases and full 
sample. This implies the higher mean values of the success cases than the 
failures. Mean differences are negative for health and stability of the target 
economy, cost to sender and the GDP growth rate of the target. It implies 
lower mean values of the success cases of economic sanctions. Whereas the 
sign of mean difference is positive for GNP ratio in the common cases, it is 
negative in the full sample. This study finds the significant mean difference for 
health and stability and GDP growth rate in the common cases and full sample 
respectively. Therefore, economic sanctions are more effective in the case of 
less GDP growth of a target country. 
In the common cases for regime change and democratization, the negative 
mean differences are observed for cost to target, GNP ratio, health and 
stability, cost to sender and inflation. But in the full sample, mean difference 
for inflation is found to be positive. In addition, the sign is negative for cost 
per capita. Whereas cost to target is higher for the success cases of modest 
policy change, it is lower for regime change and democratization. Though no 
mean difference coefficients are statistically significant, however sign can play 
role to the success of economic sanctions. 
For military disruption, Table 24 shows that though the mean values of 
the success cases for economic variables are same both in the common cases 
and full sample, these differ in the failure cases and this, in turn, makes the 
difference in the values of the mean differences. In the full sample, this study 
finds no significant mean differences for any of economic variables. However, 
we can say that the mean values of the success cases are lower than the failure 
cases for all economic variables except for health and stability. 
Here we see that all the mean values of economic variables differ between 
common cases and full sample.  Whereas cost as a percentage of GNP and 
cost per capita are found as determinants of success of military impairment in 
the common cases, we find that cost to target, cost as a percentage of GNP, 
cost per capita and cost to sender are the determinants of success of military 
impairment in the full sample. Whereas the sign is negative for cost to sender 
in the common cases, it is positive and significant in the full sample. Four 
economic variables therefore are playing a very crucial role for the impairment 
of military potential.  
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Table 24 
 Mean difference test for the economic variables by foreign policy goals 
Economic variables 
Mean difference 
Modest policy Regime change and  
democratization 
Military disruption Military impairment Others 
Common Full Common Full Common Full Common Full Common Full 
Cost to target (million $) 325.40 291.67 -153.29 -284.93 -50.50 -24.83 402.92 2305.44* 1094*** 5.73 
Cost (% of GNP) 0.14 1.31 1.53 0.01 -0.38 -2.09 2.36** 8.75** 4.61** 3.10 
Cost per capita 6.44 23.98 4.71 -8.48 2.05 -3.10 15.21*** 140.16** 1.76 16.77 
Trade linkage 5.52 4.70 10.82 4.72 1.89 -8.09 1.79 15.66 0.31 9.43 
GNP ratio 3.71 -305.49 -1317.39 -2687.74 -122.97 -3316.68 24.25 1.05 -14.69 1673.67 
Health and stability -0.55** -0.34 -0.50 -0.19 -0.08 0.12 -0.12 -0.13 -0.64* -0.48 
Cost to sender -0.09 -0.18 -0.26 -0.13 0.08 -0.05 -0.04 0.54* -0.83 -0.60* 
GDP growth rate -1.49 -2.47** 1.03 0.92 -0.72 -3.10 2.04 0.75 1.44 -2.76 
Inflation 10.66 303.68 -29.81 153.46 0.02 -128.65 -12.21 -74.23 -0.14 17.14 
Note: + the detailed findings are available in table A.12. Here we have only reported the mean difference as it is worthwhile and convenient to observe the result. 
Positive sign of the mean difference implies the higher mean value for the success. 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05 and *p<0.1  
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For other major changes in the target country, there are huge variations in 
the mean values of the success and failure cases in the common and full 
sample. Significant mean differences are found for cost to target, cost as a 
percentage of GNP and health and stability in the common cases. However in 
the full sample, only one significant mean difference is found, which is cost to 
sender. Whereas mean difference is negative for GNP ratio, it is positive and 
very high in the full sample. While mean difference for GDP growth rate is 
positive in the common cases; it is negative in the full sample. The inverse 
picture of this is found for inflation. 
5.5 Econometric modelling for the determinants of success 
of the foreign policy goals 
The 1st and 2nd editions of Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, authored by Hufbauer 
et al. (1985, 1990) did not apply advanced econometric techniques to analyse 
the effectiveness of economic sanctions. Apart from the tabulation of simple 
mean values, they used ordinary least squares (OLS) to differentiate the more 
‘successful’ cases from the ‘less successful’ ones (Hufbauer et al., 2007).  
However, they did not check whether mean values of the success cases differ 
from the failure cases. This study fills up this gap using mean difference test in 
order to find the determinants of success of the economic sanctions. The 3rd 
edition also lacks in this respect, but this time Hufbauer et al have used 
econometric methods to evaluate success of the economic sanctions in 
achieving foreign policy goals (they did not estimate the marginal effects). We 
have used the latest dataset of the Peterson Institute for International 
Economics and estimated the marginal effects using the probit model for 
measuring the probability of success and then we have compared the results of 
common cases in the 2nd and 3rd editions with the full sample. This paper uses 
three specifications both for the common in the 2nd and 3rd editions and full 
sample in order to observe how sensitive the estimates are: 
• Specification (1) includes only the foreign policy goals 
• Specification (2) specification includes the foreign policy goals and 
adds political variables  
• Specification (3) specification includes the foreign policy goals and 
political variables and adds economic variables.  
 
30 
Table 25 
Probit regression results for the probability of ‘success’ of economic sanctions 
Variables  
Common cases in the 2nd edition Common cases in the 3rd edition Full sample 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Success Success Success Success Success Success Success Success Success 
Foreign policy  
(=1 if modest policy change) 
0.279* 
(0.164) 
0.324* 
(0.192) 
0.613*** 
(0.211) 
0.355*** 
(0.164) 
0.545*** 
(0.179) 
0.876*** 
(0.050) 
0.218** 
(0.115) 
0.230* 
(0.122) 
0.278** 
(0.144) 
Foreign policy (=1 if regime change and 
democratization) 
0.167 
(0.152) 
0.248 
(0.174) 
0.342 
(0.285) 
0.270* 
(0.154) 
0.549*** 
(0.169) 
0.859*** 
(0.112) 
0.019 
(0.099) 
0.039 
(0.110) 
-0.087 
(0.139) 
Foreign policy  
(=1 if military adventures) 
0.084 
(0.194) 
0.120 
(0.228) 
0.125 
(0.354) 
0.164 
(0.201) 
0.418* 
(0.239) 
0.743*** 
(0.097) 
-0.091 
(0.129) 
-0.086 
(0.132) 
-0.115 
(0.185) 
Foreign policy (=1 if military impairment) 0.069 
(0.180) 
0.189 
(0.211) 
0.370 
(0.305) 
0.078 
(0.189) 
0.289 
(0.241) 
0.749*** 
(0.105) 
0.017 
(0.123) 
0.110 
(0.139) 
0.060 
(0.171) 
Companion policies  
(=1 if regular military action) 
 0.336* 
(0.187) 
0.524*** 
(0.206) 
 0.271 
(0.203) 
0.409* 
(0.254) 
 0.093 
(0.128) 
0.106 
(0.164) 
International cooperation   -0.003 
(0.054) 
-0.074 
(0.084) 
 -0.009 
(0.056) 
-0.225 
(0.152) 
 0.028 
(0.040) 
0.036 
(0.058) 
Cooperating international organization 
(=1 if cooperates) 
 - -  0.351** 
(0.146) 
0.677*** 
(0.130) 
 0.068 
(0.092) 
0.094 
(0.123) 
International assistance  
(=1 if there is assistance to target) 
 -0.121 
(0.123) 
-0.264* 
(0.123) 
 -0.094 
(0.135) 
0.079 
(0.228) 
 -0.110 
(0.089) 
-0.005 
(0.131) 
Prior relation (1 to 3)  0.174*** 
(0.071) 
0.156 
(0.105) 
 0.149** 
(0.074) 
0.102 
(0.170) 
 0.109** 
(0.049) 
0.036 
(0.072) 
Regime of target  
(=1 if democratic) 
 - -  0.234* 
(0.134) 
0.434** 
(0.197) 
 0.125 
(0.090) 
0.124 
(0.124) 
Duration  -0.021 
(0.010) 
-0.018 
(0.013) 
 -0.010 
(0.007) 
-0.008 
(0.012) 
 -0.010* 
(0.006) 
-0.011 
(0.009) 
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Cost to target (in million $)   0.001 
(0.001) 
  0.001*** 
(0.000) 
  0.000 
(0.000) 
GNP ratio   0.000*** 
(0.000) 
  0.000 
(0.000) 
  -0.000** 
(0.000) 
Trade linkage (%)   0.005** 
(0.003) 
  0.004 
(0.004) 
  0.004* 
(0.002) 
Health and stability (=1 if distress or 
significant problems) 
  0.033 
(0.144) 
  0.149 
(0.164) 
  0.029 
(0.110) 
Cost to sender   -0.029 
(0.117) 
  0.132 
(0.121) 
  -0.007 
(0.065) 
Growth rate   -   0.046* 
(0.028) 
  0.006 
(0.010) 
Inflation   -   -0.002 
(0.002) 
  0.000** 
(0.000) 
Observations 105 105 95 105 101 65 205 199 139 
Pseudo R-squared 0.03 0.052 0.33 0.05 0.19 0.37 0.03 0.11 0.15 
Prob>chi2 0.47 0.15 0.00 0.19 0.031 0.003 0.11 0.02 0.05 
Source: Authors’ new dataset constructed from Hufbauer, Schoot, Elliot, and Oegg (2007). Robust standard errors in the parentheses.***p<0.01, **p<0.05 and *p<0.1 
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In the probit model, the dependent variable ‘success’ is strictly 
dichotomous- it is 0 or 1. This study follows Hufbauer et al (1985, 2007), for 
defining ‘success’, which is discussed in the earlier section. In the probit model, 
the variable ‘success’ is recalibrated to take on a value of 0 if the success score 
is 1, 2, 4, 6 or 8 and the success score is set at 1 if the success score is  9, 12 or 
16. As there are five foreign policy goals, this study includes four in the 
regression to compare results with the base, i.e., other major changes in the 
target country. Companion policy is also recalibrated as 1 if regular military 
action is considered and 0 for otherwise. International cooperation is a dummy 
variable which takes values from 1 to 4 (no to significant cooperation). If any 
international organization cooperates for the economic sanction, this study 
considers 1 and 0 for otherwise. If target country receives any international 
assistance, it takes value 1. International cooperation is a continuous variable 
which takes values from 1 to 3 (antagonistic to cordial). Health and stability is 
also a dummy variable taking 1 for distressed and significant problem in the 
target economy and 0, otherwise. 
Table 25 represents the results of applying the binary probit model to the 
Hufbauer-Schott-Elliot-Oegg database using only one dependent variable 
‘success’, which is the prime motive of any foreign policy goal. In this 
multivariate framework we can now show the impact of methodology and case 
selection. The marginal effects in the first and second specification are 
consistently larger and more significant in the 3rd edition than in the 2nd edition 
(column 1 and versus column 4 and 5). This implies that the 3rd edition’s 
methodology is biased in favour of finding positive results for modest policy 
change, regime change and the use of sanctions to disrupt military adventures 
and to achieve military impairment. Interestingly and despite this bias 
introduced in 105 common cases, the analysis for the full sample (205 cases) 
by and large confirms the analysis based on the data in the 2nd edition (see 
column 7 and 8). 
For comparison we also include specifications with economic variables 
(columns 3, 6 and 9), but here the results must be interpreted with caution 
because the number of observations differs considerably and therefore a fair 
comparison is only possible between column 6 and column 9. The main point 
to note here is that the full sample and 2nd edition estimates show significance 
of the GNP ratio and trade linkage.  
6 Conclusion 
This paper analysed the development of different vintages of the Peterson 
Institute database on international economic sanctions understanding to what 
extent database modification influences the effectiveness of economic 
sanctions for achieving certain foreign policy goals like modest policy change 
in the target country, regime change and democratization, military adventures 
other than major wars, military impairment including major wars and other 
major changes in the target country. It examined databases used by Hufbauer 
et al. (1985, 2007) exploring results between the common cases in the 2nd and 
3rd editions. In addition, this study also examined how the result varies between 
the common cases and full sample in the third edition. For that purposes, this 
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study used descriptive statistics, ratio analysis, first-difference method and 
finally, probit determinants of success.  This study finds that within the 
common cases of the 2nd and 3rd edition, about 17% of the cases are modified 
and changed to some extent. Even in some cases, principal sender and target 
are changed. The number of goals is raised to 155 from 146 and the average 
number of goals to 1.53 from 1.45 in the 3rd edition for the same 101 cases. 
The list of political and economic variables is extended in the 3rd edition 
including cooperating international organization, regime of target, political 
stability prior and during the economic sanctions, GDP growth and inflation. 
While health and stability is considered as political variable in the 2nd edition, it 
is under the list of economic variables in the 3rd edition. In cases of core 
variables, substantial change is found for contribution due to redefining the 
index value of sanction contribution. The value index 1 implies zero or 
negative contribution in the in 2nd edition whereas it indicates only negative 
contribution in the 3rd edition and substantial and decisive contributions are 
replaced in the 3rd instead of modest and significant contribution. The average 
success scores are 6.58 and 6.98 for the common cases in the 2nd and 3rd 
edition respectively. This study finds the higher mean values for all categories 
of core variables for the common cases in the 3rd edition and the average 
values of economic variables also differ across editions. 
The success ratios of all foreign policy goals except for the modest policy 
change are lower than the overall success ratio in the full sample of the 3rd 
edition. Success ratios of the core variables are found less in the full sample 
compared to the common cases in the 3rd edition. Whereas success ratio of 
minor international cooperation is substantially lower in the full sample, it is 
higher for modest and significant international cooperation. Very poor success 
ratios are found for antagonistic prior relation, autocratic regime of target and 
international assistance to target both in the common and full sample in the 3rd 
edition. Whereas success ratio of the distressed target economy is lower in the 
full sample, it is higher for the state of strong and stable target economy. In 
case of only financial sanction type, success ratio is substantially higher in the 
common than the full sample. Success ratios of the net gain to sender and little 
effect on sender are higher in the common; it is found for the modest and 
major loss to sender. Among the cost categories to the target, cost as a 
percentage of GNP and cost per capita have the higher success ratios 
compared to others though they differ between the common and full sample. 
Trade linkage and inflation also play an important role as this study finds the 
higher trade linkages between the sender and target and higher inflation in the 
target bring more success to the economic sanctions. This study finds two 
important determinants of success (duration and prior relation) from the 
political variables and three (cost as a % of GNP, health and stability and cost 
to sender) in the common cases. However, we find one more important 
determinant which is regime of target for the political variables and two 
determinants (health and stability and inflation) for the economic variables in 
the full sample. Though the mean differences vary between the common and 
full sample, this study finds the significant mean differences between the 
success and failure groups. Mean difference test for the political variables by 
the foreign policy goals finds that regime of target is the most important 
determinant both in the common and full sample. But full sample recognizes 
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one more important determinant which is duration of economic sanction. This 
study also finds that prior relation has significant mean differences between the 
success and failure groups in the common case. However, it finds prior 
relation and regime of target in the full sample. Political stability prior to the 
sanction is found as an important determinant for other major changes in the 
target in the common cases but not in the full sample.  It is prior relation to 
target in the full sample. This study finds no significant mean differences in the 
common and full sample for military disruption and impairment. For the 
modest policy change, significant mean difference is found for health and 
stability and GDP growth in the common case and full sample respectively. In 
cases of regime change and democratization and military disruption other than 
major wars, this study finds no significant mean differences between the 
success and failure cases both in the common and full sample. However for 
military impairment, significant mean differences are found for cost as a 
percentage of GNP and cost per capita in the common cases. Full sample adds 
one more determinant which is cost to target in this regard. In the common 
cases, cost to target and cost as a percentage of GNP are found as the two 
most important determinants of other major changes in the target. In the full 
sample, only cost to sender has significant mean difference. 
The probit model gives a consistent result only for the modest policy 
change. It implies that the probability of success of the modest policy change is 
significantly higher than that of the other major changes in the target country. 
Importantly the probit analysis provides a multivariate framework than enables 
us to show that the 3rd edition’s methodology in comparison to the 
methodology used in the 2nd edition is biased in favour of finding positive 
results for modest policy change, regime change and the use of sanctions to 
disrupt military adventures and to achieve military impairment. 
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Appendices 
Table A.1 
Reflection of changes in policy result 
Policy result 
Edition  
2nd 3rd 
Failed outcome 27.6 24.8 
Unclear but possibly positive 25.7 21.0 
Positive outcome 14.3 18.1 
Successful outcome 32.4 36.2 
N=105 (Common cases) 
Source: Authors tabulated from new dataset constructed from Hufbauer et al. (1985 & 2007). 
Table A.2 
Reflection of changes regarding contribution 
Sanctions contribution* 
2nd edition 
(% of cases) 
3rd edition 
 (% of cases) 
Zero or negative/Negative 
contribution 
31.4 7.6 
Minor contribution 27.6 52.4 
Modest/Substantial contribution 27.6 31.4 
Significant/Decisive contribution 13.3 8.6 
N=105 
Note: *First and second component refer to 2nd and 3rd edition respectively. 
Table A.3 
Comparison of companion policies 
Companion policies 
2ndedition 3rdedition 
Cases % of 
cases 
Cases % of 
cases 
Regular military action 13 33.3 13 37.1 
Quasi-military action 9 23.1 8 22.9 
Covert action 10 25.6 8 22.9 
Quasi and regular military action 3 7.7 2 5.7 
Quasi-military and convert action 4 10.3 4 11.4 
Total  39 100 35 100 
 
  
37 
Table A.4 
Comparison of international cooperation 
International cooperation* 
2ndedition 3rdedition 
% of cases % of cases 
No cooperation (=1) 46.7 47.6 
Minor cooperation (=2) 21.0 21.0 
Modest cooperation (=3) 20.0 19.0 
Significant cooperation (=4) 12.4 12.4 
N=105 
Note: *Figure in the parentheses implies the index value for that particular category. 
Table A.5 
Comparison of prior relation 
Types of prior relation* 
% of cases in the 
2nd edition 
% of cases in the 
3rd edition 
Antagonistic (=1) 21.9 22.9 
Neutral (=2) 47.6 47.6 
Cordial (=3) 30.5 29.5 
N=105 
Note: *Figure in the parentheses implies the index value for that particular category. 
Table A.6 
Comparison of success cases by foreign policy goals 
Foreign policy goals  
Common cases Full sample 
Success 
cases 
% Success 
cases 
% 
Modest policy changes 11 29.73 22 31.43 
Regime Change and 
democratization 
15 40.54 25 35.71 
Disruption of military 
Adventure 
4 10.81 4 5.71 
Military impairment  4 10.81 9 12.86 
Other major policy changes  3 8.11 10 14.29 
Total  37 100 70 100 
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Table A.7 
Success ratio by foreign policy goals 
Foreign policies  
Common cases Full sample 
Success  
cases 
Failure  
cases 
Total 
cases 
Success 
ratio 
Success 
cases 
Failure  
cases 
Total 
cases 
Success 
ratio 
Modest policy changes 11 11 22 50 22 21 43 51 
Regime Change and 
democratization 
15 21 36 42 25 55 80 31 
Disruption of military 
Adventure 
4 9 13 31 4 15 19 21 
Military impairment  4 13 17 24 9 20 29 31 
Other major policy 
changes  
3 14 17 18 10 24 33 27 
Total  37 68 105 35 70 135 205 34 
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Table A.8 
Comparison of success ratios of core and political variables 
Variables Common case Full sample 
Success 
cases 
Failure 
cases 
Total Ratio Success 
cases 
Failure 
cases 
Total Ratio 
Core variables 
Policy result  37 68 105 35.2 70 135 205 34.1 
Sanction Contribution 37 68 105 35.2 70 134 204 34.3 
Success score 37 68 105 35.2 70 134 204 34.3 
Political variables : 
Companion Policies 
Regular military action 4 9 13 30.8 9 18 27 33.3 
Quasi-military operation 3 5 8 37.5 4 15 19 21.1 
Covert action 5 3 8 62.5 5 4 9 55.6 
International Cooperation 
No cooperation 20 30 50 40.0 34 49 83 41.0 
Minor cooperation 7 15 22 31.8 8 39 47 17.0 
Modest  cooperation 6 14 20 30.0 17 29 46 37.0 
Significant contribution 4 9 13 30.8 11 17 28 39.3 
Prior Relation 
Antagonistic  3 21 24 12.5 9 39 48 18.8 
Neutral  18 32 50 36.0 29 58 87 33.3 
Cordial  16 15 31 51.6 32 37 69 46.4 
Regime of target 
Autocracy 14 35 49 28.6 24 68 92 26.1 
Democracy 11 13 24 45.8 24 26 50 48.0 
Others 
International assistance to 
target 
6 17 23 26.1 8 31 39 20.5 
Cooperating international 
organization 
6 6 12 50.0 15 26 41 36.6 
Duration less than or equal 
average 
31 48 79 39.2 58 89 147 39.5 
Duration greater than average 6 20 26 23.1 12 45 57 21.1 
Note: Authors calculated from new data set. 
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Table A.9 
Comparison of success ratios of economic variables 
Economic variables  Common case Third edition 
Success 
cases 
Failure 
cases 
Total Success 
ratio 
Success 
cases 
Failure 
cases 
Total Success 
ratio 
Health and Stability 
Distressed 13 6 19 68.4 25 34 59 42.4 
Significant problems 16 31 47 34.0 30 59 89 33.7 
Strong and stable 8 31 39 20.5 15 42 57 26.3 
Health and stability overall  37 68 105 35.2 70 135 205 34.1 
Sanctions type 
Financial, export or import 16 33 49 32.7 32 68 100 32.0 
Export, import or both 5 19 24 20.8 10 30 40 25.0 
Only financial 12 13 25 48.0 19 34 53 35.8 
Overall of sanction type 33 65 98 33.7 61 132 193 31.6 
Cost to sender  
Net gain to sender 15 17 32 46.9 26 37 63 41.3 
Little effect on sender 17 33 50 34.0 31 69 100 31.0 
Modest loss 4 13 17 23.5 10 22 32 31.2 
Major loss 1 5 6 16.7 3 7 10 30.0 
Cost to sender overall 37 68 105 35.2 70 135 205 34.1 
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Cost to target 
Cost to target (<= average) in million $ 26 47 73 35.6 48 109 157 30.6 
Cost to target (>average) in million $ 7 14 21 33.3 12 12 24 50.0 
Cost as a % of GNP (<= average) 21 46 67 31.3 38 92 130 29.2 
Cost as a % of GNP (>average) 12 14 26 46.2 22 26 48 45.8 
Cost per capita (<= average) 23 54 77 29.9 47 108 155 30.3 
Cost per capita (>average) 10 6 16 62.5 13 12 25 52.0 
Trade linkage  
Trade linkage (<= average) 18 43 61 29.5 39 84 123 31.7 
Trade linkage (> average) 19 23 42 45.2 31 47 78 39.7 
Trade linkage overall 37 66 103 35.9 70 131 201 34.8 
GNP ratio (<=average) 31 59 90 34.4 64 117 181 35.4 
GNP ratio (>average) 6 8 14 42.9 6 17 23 26.1 
GDP growth (<=average) 18 30 48 37.5 30 56 86 34.9 
GDP growth (>average) 16 29 45 35.6 36 63 99 36.4 
Inflation (<=average) 26 33 59 44.1 55 92 147 37.4 
Inflation (>average) 6 9 15 40.0 8 7 15 53.3 
Note: Authors calculation. 
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Table A.10 
Mean difference test of the core variables by foreign policy goals 
Variables Common case Full sample 
Success Failure Mean 
Difference 
Success Failure Mean 
Difference 
Modest policy change 
Policy result 3.55 1.55 2.55*** 3.45 1.71 1.74*** 
Sanction 
Contribution 
3.27 2.00 1.27*** 3.32 2.19 1.13*** 
Success score 11.64 3.18 8.45*** 11.50 3.86 7.64*** 
Regime change and democratization 
Policy result 3.73 2.38 1.35*** 3.64 2.42 1.22*** 
Sanction 
Contribution 
3.07 1.95 1.11*** 3.20 2.07 1.13*** 
Success score 11.47 4.86 6.61*** 11.64 5.04 6.60*** 
Disruption of military adventures other than major wars 
Policy result 4.00 2.11 1.89*** 4.00 2.67 1.33** 
Sanction 
Contribution 
3.50 1.78 1.72*** 3.50 1.87 1.63*** 
Success score 14.00 4.00 10.00*** 14.00 5.20 8.80*** 
Impairment of military potential including major war 
Policy result 4.00 1.77 2.23*** 3.78 1.70 2.08*** 
Sanction 
Contribution 
3.50 1.92 1.58*** 3.22 1.80 1.42*** 
Success score 14.00 3.46 10.54*** 12.22 3.20 9.02*** 
Other major changes in the target country 
Policy result 3.67 2.29 1.38* 3.40 1.92 1.48*** 
Sanction 
Contribution 
3.33 2.07 1.26*** 3.20 2.00 1.20*** 
Success score 12.33 4.71 7.62*** 10.80 3.96 6.84*** 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05 and *p<0.1 
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Table A.11 
Mean difference test of the political variables by foreign policy goals 
Political Variables 
Common case Third edition 
Success Failure Mean 
Difference 
Success Failure Mean 
Difference 
Modest policy changes 
International cooperation  1.55 1.64 -0.09 1.50 1.86 -0.36 
Duration 2.64 5.73 -3.09 2.86 6.52 -3.66** 
Prior relation  2.18 2.00 0.18 2.36 2.05 0.32 
Regime of target 2.27 1.55 0.73* 2.32 1.70 0.62** 
Political stability prior 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.11 0.16 -0.04 
Political stability during 0.05 0.14 -0.09 0.04 0.14 -0.09 
Regime Change and democratization 
International cooperation  1.73 2.10 -0.36 2.04 2.20 -0.16 
Duration 7.40 10.00 -2.60 5.44 8.00 -2.56 
Prior relation  2.47 1.90 0.56** 2.52 2.15 0.37** 
Regime of target 1.71 1.45 0.26 1.92 1.46 0.45*** 
Political stability prior 0.10 0.20 -0.10 0.12 0.19 -0.06 
Political stability during 0.14 0.11 0.03 0.13 0.15 -0.03 
Disruption of military adventures other than major wars 
International cooperation  2.50 2.22 0.28 2.50 2.20 0.30 
Duration 1.25 5.22 -3.97 1.25 6.13 -4.88 
Prior relation  2.25 1.89 0.36 2.25 1.93 0.32 
Regime of target 1.75 1.67 0.08 1.75 1.93 -0.18 
Political stability prior 0.33 0.13 0.19 0.33 0.18 0.15 
Political stability during - - - - - - 
Impairment of military potential including major wars 
International cooperation  2.50 2.46 0.04 2.89 2.40 0.49 
Duration 1.75 8.23 -6.48 6.22 11.70 -5.48 
Prior relation  2.25 1.69 0.56 1.56 1.65 -0.09 
Regime of target 1.25 1.77 -0.52 1.22 1.70 -0.48 
Political stability prior 0.08 0.20 -0.13 0.04 0.21 -0.16 
Political stability during 0.00 0.02 -0.02 0 0.03 -0.03 
Other major changes in the target country 
International cooperation  1.67 1.71 -0.05 2.50 1.78 0.72* 
Duration 1.67 11.79 -10.12 3.70 9.78 -6.08 
Prior relation  2.67 2.07 0.60 2.50 1.87 0.63** 
Regime of target 3.00 2.00 1.00 2.33 2.00 0.33 
Political stability prior 0.35 0.03 0.32** 0.14 0.09 0.05 
Political stability during 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.07 0.04 0.03 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05 and *p<0.1 
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Table A.12 
Mean difference test of the economic variables by foreign policy goals 
 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05 and *p<0.1 
 
Economic Variables 
Common case (mean) Third edition (mean) 
Success Failure Mean 
Difference  
Success Failure Mean 
Difference  
Modest policy changes 
Cost to target (in million $) 367.90 42.50 325.40 341.32 49.65 291.67 
Cost (% of GNP) 0.95 0.81 0.14 2.55 1.24 1.31 
Cost per capita 10.59 4.15 6.44 32.78 8.81 23.98 
Trade linkage 19.59 14.07 5.52 23.06 18.36 4.70 
GNP ratio 105.55 101.85 3.71 285.35 590.84 -305.49 
Health and stability 2.09 2.63 -0.55** 2.05 2.38 -0.34 
Cost to sender 1.73 1.82 -0.09 1.73 1.90 -0.18 
GDP growth rate 3.70 5.19 -1.49 1.49 3.95 -2.47** 
inflation 20.48 9.82 10.66 326.12 22.44 303.68 
Regime Change and democratization 
Cost to target (in million $) 91.51 244.80 -153.29 185.48 470.41 -284.93 
Cost (% of GNP) 3.58 2.06 1.53 3.57 3.56 0.01 
Cost per capita 22.93 18.21 4.71 24.08 32.56 -8.48 
Trade linkage 34.91 24.09 10.82 42.51 37.80 4.72 
GNP ratio 671.13 1988.52 -1317.39 1297.64 3985.38 -2687.74 
Health and stability 1.40 1.90 -0.50 1.48 1.67 -0.19 
Cost to sender 1.60 1.86 -0.26 1.60 1.73 -0.13 
GDP growth rate 4.88 3.84 1.03 3.54 2.62 0.92 
inflation 11.06 40.87 -29.81 185.94 32.48 153.46 
Disruption of military adventures other than major wars 
Cost to target (in million $) 110.50 161.00 -50.50 110.50 135.33 -24.83 
Cost (% of GNP) 0.85 1.23 -0.38 0.85 2.94 -2.09 
Cost per capita 2.59 1.92 2.05 2.59 5.69 -3.10 
Trade linkage 21.50 19.61 1.89 21.50 29.59 -8.09 
GNP ratio 63.25 186.22 -122.97 63.25 3379.93 -3316.68 
Health and stability 2.25 2.33 -0.08 2.25 2.13 0.12 
Cost to sender 1.75 1.67 0.08 1.75 1.80 -0.05 
GDP growth rate 2.55 3.28 -0.72 2.55 5.65 -3.10 
inflation 16.80 16.78 0.02 16.80 145.45 -128.65 
Impairment of military potential including major wars 
Cost to target (in million $) 613.00 210.08 402.92 2605.14 299.70 2305.44* 
Cost (% of GNP) 2.60 0.24 2.36** 9.54 0.79 8.75** 
Cost per capita 16.14 0.94 15.21*** 143.23 3.07 140.16** 
Trade linkage 19.25 17.46 1.79 36.88 21.22 15.66 
GNP ratio 47.75 23.50 24.25 132.89 131.84 1.05 
Health and stability 2.50 2.62 -0.12 2.22 2.35 -0.13 
Cost to sender 2.50 2.54 -0.04 2.89 2.35 0.54* 
GDP growth rate 5.78 3.74 2.04 4.11 3.37 0.75 
inflation 39.48 51.68 -12.21 22.98 97.20 -74.23 
Other major changes in the target country 
Cost to target (in million $) 1150.33 56.75 1093.58*** 1045.60 1051.33 5.73 
Cost (% of GNP) 5.21 o.60 4.61** 5.54 2.44 3.10 
Cost per capita 10.33 8.57 1.76 65.21 81.98 16.77 
Trade linkage 20.33 20.02 0.31 33.78 24.34 9.43 
GNP ratio 16.01 30.71 -14.69 3084.93 1411.27 1673.67 
Health and stability 2.00 2.64 -0.64* 1.90 2.38 -0.48 
Cost to sender 1.67 2.50 -0.83 1.90 2.50 -0.60* 
GDP growth rate 6.75 5.31 1.44 1.08 3.84 -2.76 
inflation 7.35 7.49 -0.14 31.96 14.82 17.14 
 
